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ACTUARIAL LIABILITY: ERISA, MALPRACTICE
AND THE EQUITY FUNDING FRAUD
I. Introduction
The role of the actuary' has undergone major changes, especially
since passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (Act).2 Prior to that Act, actuaries enjoyed relative professional
anonymity, but ERISA has changed this, affording actuaries new
and perhaps unwanted exposure. Under ERISA, actuaries are now
required to certify their work.' The Act further provides for manda-
tory membership in the "Enrolled Society of Actuaries"4 before an
actuary can prepare any actuarial statements or reports filed with
the Department of Labor or the Department of the Treasury (Inter-
nal Revenue Service). These developments suggest that actuaries
may be held accountable for their negligence. In addition, actuaries
are now confronted with the controversial issue of whether they are
or can be fiduciaries under ERISA. As such, they would be subject
to further duties and responsibilities, as well as liabilities, and sanc-
tions for breaches of any duty owed.5 So, ERISA has introduced new
responsibilities to the role of the actuary who must act indepen-
dently and on behalf of all the plan participants in determining
pension costs.
The provisions of ERISA evidence the overriding Congressional
concern for the protection of the benefit rights of plan participants
and beneficiaries To accomplish this, increased responsibilities are
1. An actuary has been defined as one trained in mathematics and statistics whose busi-
ness is to calculate insurance and annuity premiums, reserves, and dividends. W.aSTR's
THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 22 (unabr. ed. 1964). Today, actuaries, especially those
specializing in pensions, provide many additional services in an advisory capacity and there-
fore have exposed themselves to greater professional liability.
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 26, 29, 31, & 42 of the United States Code)
[hereinafter ERISA].
3. ERISA § 1033, 26 U.S.C. § 6059 (Supp. V 1975).
4. Id. §§ 3041-43, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1241-42, 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. V 1975).
5. The Act imposes on all fiduciaries a general requirement that they must discharge their
duties solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan. In addition, a
fiduciary must act exclusively for the purpose of providing benefits to participants and benefi-
ciaries and defraying reasonable expenses of the plan. Similarly, he must conform to the
documents and instruments governing the plan, but only insofar as they are consistent with
the regulatory provisions of the Act. See text accompanying notes 77-79 infra.
6. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1975).
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imposed on all plan parties including actuaries. These new obliga-
tions address plan qualification, reporting, disclosure, fiduciary re-
sponsibility, vesting, funding, and plan termination insurance. In
addition, the actuary will be obligated to perform his duties with
greater independence. With this requirement, however, will come
greater scrutiny and accountability to all parties.
II. Actuarial Requirements of ERISA
The inclusion of detailed actuarial requirements in ERISA estab-
lished standards for pension actuaries and recognized certain reali-
ties of actuarial practice, among them that pension actuarial work
had become a specialized field7 and the majority of actuaries, in-
cluding those in the recognized actuarial organizations, were in-
volved in more than strictly pension actuarial work, and often had
no real pension knowledge.' In addition, a number of individuals
had developed proficiency in pension actuarial work through experi-
ence rather than through passage of actuarial examinations. Many
of these individuals were not members of any actuarial organiza-
tion.' Finally, some individuals who called themselves pension actu-
aries were not competent in mathematics and actuarial concepts,
although many had a reasonable knowledge of the pension field. 0
A. The Joint Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries
The ERISA solution was to create the Joint Board for the Enroll-
ment of Actuaries, " whose function is to identify and establish stan-
dards of competence for a pension actuary. The legislative history
indicates the intent of Federal enrollment of actuaries - the
achievement of independent, competent professional work. 2 The
Joint Board establishes professional qualifications and standards
for actuaries of all employee benefit plans covered by ERISA and
enrolls those qualified to practice actuarial matters before the De-
7. Zischke, Problems of the Actuary Under ERISA, SEVENTH ANNUAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
INSTITUTE 439, 441 (1976).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 442.
11. ERISA § 3041, 29 U.S.C. § 1241 (Supp. V 1975).
12. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974), reprinted in Comm. on Lab. and Pub. Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SECURITY AcT OF 1974 (1976).
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partment of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service." The Joint
Board also is authorized to suspend or terminate enrollment of an
actuary whose conduct has not been in compliance with the provi-
sions of the Act. 4
The Act requires all employee benefit plans to appoint one or
more administrators who have full responsibility for the operation
of the plan. The administrator's authority and responsibility are
deemed to include the establishment of a funding method and pol-
icy consistent with the objectives of the plan'and the power to
amend the plan when necessary to meet the requirements of the
regulatory provisions of the Act or to protect the interests of the
participants. 5 Although the enrollment process and its inherent
prerequisite qualifications and standards are in effect, the pension
plan administrator's duties are not discharged merely by ascertain-
ing that an actuary holds a certificate of enrollment. The plan ad-
ministrator is a "named fiduciary"'" under ERISA, and therefore
must exercise prudence in selecting and retaining the enrolled ac-
tuary for the plan. 7 In selecting an actuary, the administrator or
trustees should inquire as to the experience of the actuary or his
firm, the range of services provided, the ability of the actuary to
communicate in a manner which is understood, and the actuary's
familiarity with governmental requirements for pension plans."
B. Responsibilities and Professional Independence
Multiple responsibilities accrue directly to the enrolled actuary of
a defined benefit pension plan. The actuary must perform an ac-
tuarial valuation of the plan at least once every three years, or more
frequently if necessary to support his opinion, included in the ac-
tuarial report and also in the event of a plan merger or consolida-
tion. 'I An actuary must also state that to the best of his knowledge
the actuarial report is complete and accurate0 (for both Department
13. ERISA §§ 3041-43, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1241-42 (Supp. V 1975).
14. Id. § 3042, 29 U.S.C. § 1242 (Supp. V 1975).
15. Id. § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (Supp. V 1975).
16. Id. § 402(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 301 (1974).
18. Grubbs, Jr., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J. 15 (Winter 1977).
19. ERISA § 103(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(d) (Supp. V 1975).
20. Id. In addition, the actuary must state that, in his opinion, "the assumptions used in
the aggregate a) are reasonably related to the experience of the plan and to reasonable
1978]
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of Labor and Internal Revenue Service purposes), as well as certify
what plan contributions are necessary to reduce any accumulated
funding deficiency to zero." Furthermore, the actuary must justify
any changes in the actuarial assumptions or cost methods2 and
state that all costs and liabilities are determined on the basis of
reasonable actuarial assumptions and methods which, in combina-
tion, offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience
under the plan.2" Moreover, the actuary is obliged to offer an opinion
that the contents of the matters in the actuarial report meet the
criteria above. Finally, the actuary must report all information
necessary to fully and fairly disclose the actuarial position of the
plan.
These extensive responsibilities appear to raise the accountability
of the actuary to the highest levels. All actuarial reports and state-
ments are subject not only to Department of Labor and Internal
Revenue Service review but also to public disclosure. Furthermore,
the Act provides that all the above enumerated duties be performed
on behalf of all plan participants.26
expectations, and (b) represent [his] best estimate of anticipated experience under the
plan." Int. Rev. Form 5500, Schedule B, Actuarial Information.
21. ERISA § 103(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(d) (Supp. V 1975).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 302(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
24. Id. § 1033, 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. V 1975).
25. Id. Similarly, when performing an audit, a certified public accountant must observe
"generally accepted auditing standards" which are comprised of general standards, fieldwork
standards, and standards of reporting. The standards of reporting are that:
(1) the report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in accord-
ance with generally accepted accounting principles; (2) the report shall state whether
such principles have been applied consistently in the current period in relation to the
preceding period; (3) informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be
regarded as reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report; (4) the report
shall contain either an expression of opinion regarding the financial statements taken
as a whole, or an assertion that an opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall
opinion cannot be expressed, the reasons therefore should be stated. In all cases where
an auditor's name is associated with financial statements, the report shall contain a
clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's examination, if any, and the
degree of responsibility he is taking.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS
No. 1 § 150.02 (1973).
For a proposal on adopting a code of principles and practices in the actuarial profession,
see McGinn, The Urgent Need for Actuaries to Adopt Their Own Code of Principles and
Practices, 2 PENS. AND PROFIT-SHARING TAX J. 3 (Winter 1975).
26. ERISA § 103(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
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Congress designed the above responsibilities of the actuary to
foster loyalty to the plan participants, and to insure that the ac-
tuary's independent judgement of the appropriate actuarial meth-
ods and assumptions to be used is not compromised by the plan
sponsor or others who might attempt to exert influence on the ac-
tuary. The Act also intends that a single set of actuarial methods
and assumptions be employed for all reporting, funding, and disclo-
sure requirements (e.g. in determining minimum funding and maxi-
mum tax deduction limits, reporting to participants and stockhold-
ers, etc.).27 By forcing the actuary to act in an independent manner,
the new law strives to accomplish its dual purpose of protecting the
plan participant and establishing a reasonable tax basis for allocat-
ing and allowing pension costs."
ERISA sets forth additional regulatory constraints within the
scope of which the actuary is to exercise independent judgment. The
Secretary of the Treasury may require actuarial valuations more
frequently than every three years in particular cases.2 The Secre-
tary may also challenge the reasonableness of the actuary's choice
of assumptions and methods, as they relate to the plan's actual
experience in the aggregate °.3 Any change in the actuarial cost
method (funding method) must be approved in advance by the
Secretary of the Treasury.3' The actuary will also have to comply
with numerous other requirements defining actuarial and funding
terms (e.g. acceptable actuarial cost methods and asset valuation
methods).
C. Reporting and Disclosure
The actuary summarizes his results in reports filed with both the
Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service. 32 The an-
nual report to the Labor Department must include a complete ac-
tuarial statement relative to the plan year prepared by the enrolled
actuary and filed by the plan administrator within 210 days after
27. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1974).
28. Mueller, What Practitioners Should Know About the Expanded Role of the Actuary
Under ERISA, 42 J. TAXATION 149 (1975).
29. ERISA § 103(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(d) (Supp. V 1975).
30. Id. § 302(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (c) (Supp. V 1975).
31. Id. § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(5) (Supp. V 1975).
32. Id. § 103(a)(1)(B)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1975).
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the close of the plan year.3 The actuarial report to be filed by the
plan administrator must also be prepared by an enrolled actuary. 4
The plan administrator must file an actuarial statement of valua-
tion with the Internal Revenue Service not less than thirty days
before a merger, consolidation, or transfer of assets of a plan. 5
D. Enforcement
ERISA places great import on the reporting requirements and is
replete with remedies to enforce them. The failure to file an ac-
tuarial report on time or without acceptable cause for delay may
subject the plan administrator to a $1,000 penalty36 as well as to a
civil action.3
The Secretary of Labor may reject a filing of a report if he deter-
mines that such report is incomplete or that there is a material
qualification contained in the opinion of the actuary.38 He may then
retain an enrolled actuary on behalf of the plan participants to
prepare an actuarial statement s.3 The plan actuary may also be
disenrolled, after notice and hearing, for failure to discharge his
duties under the Act. 40
Other more general enforcement provisions also serve to check the
conduct of the actuary. Persons who willfully violate the reporting
and disclosure provisions are subject to criminal penalties.,, In addi-
tion, those convicted of specific crimes, including violations of
ERISA, are prohibited from serving as consultants to any employee
benefit plan.2 However, it is the fiduciary responsibility provisions
33. Id. § 104(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
34. Id. § 103(a)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
35. Id. § 1031, 26 U.S.C. § 6058 (Supp. V 1975).
36. Id. § 1033, 26 U.S.C. § 6692 (Supp. V 1975).
37. Id. § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. V 1975). A participant or beneficiary of a plan is
authorized to sue to recover benefits due him under a plan or to clarify his rights to future
benefits. Id. § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975). Such person can also
sue to enjoin any act or practice which violates any of the regulatory provisions of the Act.
Id. § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
38. Id. § 104(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
39. Id. § 104(a)(5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(5)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
40. Id. § 3042(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1242(b) (Supp. V 1975).
41. Id. § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (Supp. V 1975).
42. Id. § 411, 29 U.S.C. § 1111 (Supp. V 1975). A person who has been convicted of
specified crimes (e.g. robbery, bribery, extortion, fraud, a violation of any provision of ERISA,
and certain other felonies, etc.) is prohibited from serving as an administrator, officer, trus-
tee, custodian, counsel, agent or employee of a plan. In addition, such person is prohibited
from serving as a consultant to a plan. Intentional violation of this provision of the Act carries
[Vol. VI
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of the Act which have given actuaries the most concern." A fidu-
ciary who breaches any of the responsibilities imposed by the Act
not only is subject to removal, but is also held personally liable to
restore any losses resulting therefrom." A fiduciary also has a "co-
fiduciary" responsibility to prevent a breach by another fiduciary."5
a maximum fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year or both. Both the
person who served the plan in violation of the Act and the person who permitted him to do
so are subject to the foregoing punishment. Id.
43. Id. §§ 401-14, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (Supp. V 1975). For a comprehensive review of
the fiduciary provisions of ERISA, see Little, Jr. and Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA:
A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1977). See also Lamon, Jr., Professional Money
Managers: Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA, 11 REAL PROP. PaOB. AND Ta. J. 519 (1976).
44. ERISA provides that a fiduciary who breaches any of his responsibilities or duties is
liable personally to restore any losses to the plan or profits made from the use of plan assets
as a result of such breach. ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (Supp. V 1975). The fiduciary is
also subject to any other equitable remedy that a court deems appropriate, including removal.
Such an action may be brought by the Secretary of Labor, a beneficiary, participant, or
another fiduciary. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975). Furthermore,
a beneficiary or participant may bring a civil action to recover any benefits due him, to
enforce any rights that the beneficiary or participant may have under the plan, or to clarify
any future rights. ERISA §§ 502(a)(1), 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1), 1132(a)(3) (Supp.
V 1975). Eaves v. Penn, 426 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Okla. 1976) is an excellent example of the
Labor Department's enforcement of the fiduciary provisions of ERISA. The case was the first
such action brought by the Department of Labor under ERISA. The Department alleged that
the three trustee-fiduciaries of Glen's, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan sold corporate stock to the
plan in violation of fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA, causing substantial injury to
the plan, its participants and beneficiaries. By exchanging cash assets for securities of unde-
terminable market value, the transactions impaired the plan's ability to meet obligations to
participants and beneficiaries. The three trustees executed an agreement for the sale to the
third trustee and the profit sharing plan of all stock of an Oklahoma City restaurant owned
by two of the trustees. The Labor Department further alleged that the three trustees benefited
because one of them gained control of the restaurant, its assets, and the profit sharing plan
assets without paying substantial consideration and because the other two trustees were
allowed to liquidate their holding in the restaurant for more than $1 million.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma found that the three
trustees were fiduciaries and breached their responsibility to act solely in the interest of
participants and beneficiaries and to defray reasonable expenses of plan administration. The
three trustees failed to perform their duties with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances that a prudent man acting in a similar capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of such a plan. The failure to meet their fiduciary obliga-
tions with respect to the plan violated §§ 404(a)(1)(A) and 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, the court
held. Having found such violations, the court relied on its broad discretion to provide reme-
dial and equitable relief and ordered a rescission of the sale and removal of the trustees. The
court further ordered restoration of income and profits lost to the plan, and the appointment
of a court-appointed trustee.
45. ERISA § 405, 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (Supp. V 1975). See text accompanying notes 58-64
infra.
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Finally, a fiduciary must not cause a plan to engage in a prohibited
transaction .46
IM. The Fiduciary Provisions of ERISA
A. ERISA's Amorphous Definition
Section 3(21) of ERISA and section 4975(e)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code define the term "fiduciary." As so defined, a fidu-
ciary is anyone who exercises discretionary control or authority over
plan management or assets or anyone possessing discretionary au-
thority or responsibility in the administration of a plan. A fiduciary
is also anyone who provides investment advice to a plan for compen-
sation. 7 The broad scope of this definition is readily apparent and
even though a person has not been officially designated as a plan
fiduciary, he must be extremely careful to avoid such status and
therefore not assume the duties imposed on fiduciaries by ERISA.
An actuary, strictly defined, does not seem to be a fiduciary,
definitionally, under ERISA. The Department of Labor, in an in-
terpretive bulletin, has stated that an actuary who renders actuarial
consulting services to an employee benefit plan (other than as an
investment advisor) is not a fiduciary of the plan solely by rendering
such services.4" However, an actuary's conduct will classify him as
46. Id. § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (Supp. V 1975). See text accompanying notes 68-72 infra.
47. ERISA § 3(21)(A) provides:
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discre-
tionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exer-
cises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii)
he renders investment advice for a fee, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys
or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii)
he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration
of such plan.
48. An actuary, attorney, accountant, or consultant will be a fiduciary if his or her author.
ity or actual performance falls within the definition of the term fiduciary. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-
5, D-1 (1977). The Internal Revenue Code notes that such persons would also be considered
to be fiduciaries within the meaning of section 4975(e)(3) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
§ 4975(e)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
the terms fiduciary means any person who:
(A) exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting manage-
ment of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets,
(B) renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with
respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsi-
bility to do so, or
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a fiduciary within the meaning of the Act, if the actuary 1) exercised
discretionary authority or control respecting management of the
plan, 2) exercised authority or control respecting management or
disposition of the plan's assets, 3) for a fee (direct or indirect),
renders investment advice49 with respect to the assets of the plan or
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or 4) has any discretion-
ary authority or responsibility in the administration of the plan.
Inasmuch as the determination of fiduciary status is based essen-
tially on conduct, a person not normally considered a fiduciary (e.g.,
an actuary) may become one by virtue of his conduct relative to the
plan.
B. The Actuary as a Fiduciary
The activities necessary to elevate the actuary to the status of a
fiduciary will most likely be determined on a case by case basis in
the setting of the statutory definition.50 Yet, it is clear that ERISA
perceives the actuary as acting "like," if not "as" a fiduciary, at
(C) has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administra-
tion of such plan.
Id.
49. An actuary shall be deemed to be rendering investment advice to a plan within the
meaning of § 3(21)(A)(ii) of ERISA if:
(i) Such person renders advice to the plan as to the value of securities or other property,
or makes recommendation as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities or other property; and
(ii) Such person either directly or indirectly (e.g. through or together with any
affiliate)-
(A) Has discretionary authority or control, whether or not pursuant to agree-
ment, arrangement or understanding, with respect to purchasing or selling se-
curities or other property for the plan; or
(B) Renders any advice described in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section on a
regular basis to the plan pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement or
understanding, . . . and that such person will render individualized investment
advice to the plan based on the particular needs of the plan regarding such
matters as, among other things, investment policies or strategy, overall portfolio
composition, or diversification of plan investments.
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(1977).
50. Although the Department of Labor has taken the position that actuaries are not
fiduciaries simply by performing their typical professional services, they may be considered
fiduciaries if they exercise authority or control. Since the fiduciary provisions of ERISA are
so broad, an actuary may be deemed to exercise control over a plan, since in many instances
the employer-client usually takes his advice. As a result, the actuary is subject to suit under
ERISA and would then have the burden of proving he was not in fact a fiduciary. PENs. RaP.
(BNA), No. 160, Oct. 24, 1977 at A-29.
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least with respect to the specified duties of the actuary as imposed
by ERISA.11 The following comparisons explain this conception.
The positions of the enrolled actuary and fiduciary under ERISA
are analogous in that the former is required to be engaged on behalf
of all plan participants, and the latter is required to act solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries. 2
Furthermore, the requirement that the enrolled actuary exercise
independent judgment in the selection of actuarial assumptions and
methods in order to give his best estimate of anticipated experience
under the plan may vest the actuary with "discretionary authority
or discretionary responsibility in the administration of the plan,"53
that is similar to the discretion of a fiduciary.
Finally, the actuary's express responsibility to use reasonable as-
sumptions is similar to that of the fiduciary, who must exercise
prudence in carrying out his duties.54
The House Committee on Education and Labor, in a report to
Congress, has explicitly stated that the actuary is a fiduciary when
he performs his normal plan functions,55 and will be held to the
duties and potential personal liability, imposed on such fiduciaries
for any breach of such duties. Since the Committee intended to
include a broad range of persons within the definition of fiduciary,
the Committee was convinced that additional constraints were nec-
essary to establish the professional qualifications of those perform-
ing vital services to the plan.56 The Committee conceded there was
a substantial burden imposed on the actuary, but such burden was
consistent with the important functions performed by the actuary 7
(fiduciary).
C. Co-Fiduciary Liability
There should be major concern and substantial effort by the ac-
tuary to avoid being designated as a fiduciary under ERISA, even
51. Mueller, What Practitioners Should Know About the Expanded Role of the Actuary
Under ERISA, 42 J. TAXATION at 151. Regarding performance of other services by the actuary,
determination of fiduciary status will be on the particular facts of the situation. Id.
52. Id. See ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
53. Id. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
54. Id.





though he is subject to malpractice liability for negligent perform-
ance." This is so because potentially the most significant exposure
created for an actuary who has been determined to be a fiduciary is
the liability that exists for the breach of a fiduciary duty by another
fiduciary.59 An actuary can have a broad obligation to monitor the
performance of co-fiduciaries (those other than actuaries rendering
services to the plan) once he or she has become a fiduciary. Accord-
ingly, an actuary who is found to be a fiduciary may also be liable
for the acts of non-actuary fiduciaries.
Under ERISA, a fiduciary of a plan is to be liable for the breach
of fiduciary responsibility by another fiduciary of the plan if he
knowingly participates in or conceals the other fiduciary's breach of
a duty."0 In addition, a fiduciary is liable for another's breach of
fiduciary responsibility if he knowingly undertakes to conceal a
breach committed by the other. In order to establish this scienter,
a plaintiff must show that the participating fiduciary knows that
the other is a fiduciary with regard to the plan, knows of the act,
and knows that it constitutes a breach.6' Moreover, if a fiduciary
knows that another fiduciary of the plan has committed a breach,
and the first fiduciary knows that this is a breach, the first fiduciary
must take reasonable steps under the circumstances to remedy the
breach.2 Furthermore, a fiduciary also is to be liable for the loss
caused by another fiduciary's breach of his fiduciary responsibility
if, through his own failure to exercise prudence or otherwise comply
with the basic fiduciary rules of ERISA in carrying out his specific
responsibilities, he enables the other fiduciary to commit a breach. 3
Finally, a fiduciary has the duty not to allow the plan to engage in
a prohibited transaction. 4
58. See text accompanying notes 86-92 infra.
59. ERISA § 405, 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (Supp. V 1975).
60. Id. § 405(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Under this rule, the fiduciary
must know the other person is a fiduciary with respect to the plan, must know that he
participated in the act that constituted a breach and must know that it was a breach.
61. Id. For example, A, an actuary exercising control over the plan, and B, a trustee of
the plan, are considered fiduciaries, and B invests in a certain type of security in violation of
the trust instrument. If B tells A of this investment, A (the actuary) would be liable with B
for the breach of fiduciary responsibility if he (A) concealed this investment.
62. Id. § 405(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975). See note 76 infra. If A had the
authority to do so, and if prudent under the circumstances, A may be required to dispose of
the security acquired by B.
63. Id. § 405(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
64. Id. § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (Supp. V 1975).
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D. The Party-in-Interest and the Excise Tax
Liabilities are also imposed on an actuary as a party-in-interest 5
to the plan. An actuary clearly qualifies as a party-in-interest since
he performs services for the plan, 6 but no direct duties are imposed
on a party-in-interest by ERISA. Rather, a party-in-interest is one
who is forbidden to engage in certain transactions with the plan
fiduciary. 7 For example, an actuary, as a party-in-interest, cannot
engage in a prohibited transaction and is therefore forbidden to 1)
sell or lease property to the plan," 2) lend or borrow from the plan,6
3) furnish goods or services to the plan,76 4) receive assets from the
plan,7 or 5) acquire any employer securities for the plan.72 The duty,
however, is placed upon a fiduciary to insure that no party-in-
interest engages in these transactions. This duty is imposed when
he "knows or should know" that the transaction is a prohibited one.
ERISA provides additional sanctions against prohibited transac-
tions where the actuary himself has a liability exposure, since sec-
tion 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code specifically allows for civil
penalty in the form of a 5% excise tax of the amount involved in the
transaction.73 This tax is imposed for the taxable year of the transac-
tion and for each subsequent year (or portion thereof) in which it is
not corrected.74 If the prohibited transaction is not corrected, the
party-in-interest (perhaps an actuary) is subject to an excise tax
equal to 100% of the amount of the transaction.75 Neither the 5%
65. Id. § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (Supp. V 1975).
66. Id. § 3(14)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (14)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
67. Accordingly, the duty to prevent such a transaction is placed upon the fiduciary, and
if the fiduciary commits a breach, he is responsible as a fidudciary. The party-in-interest is
also subject to penalties, but not as a fiduciary. See notes 78-80 infra.
68. ERISA § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
69. Id. § 406(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
70. Id. § 406(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
71. Id. § 406(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1975).
72. Id. § 406(a)(1)(E), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(E) (Supp. V 1975).
73. ERISA § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(a).
74. Id.
75. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(b). The initial tax is an amount equal to five percent of the amount
involved with respect to the prohibited transaction for each year in the taxable period. The
taxable period is a period beginning with the date on which the prohibited transaction occurs
and ending with the earlier of either the date of the mailing of a notice of deficiency with
respect to the tax or the date on which the correction of the prohibited transaction is com-
pleted. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(f)(2). If the prohibited transaction is not corrected within the
correction period, an additional tax of one hundred percent of the amount involved in the
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excise tax nor the 100% excise tax is deductible. Similarly, payment
of the tax does not relieve the party-in-interest of his duty to the
plan or of his obligation to correct the transaction.7"
E. Summary
The determination of whether fiduciary status exists is one of the
most important determinations under ERISA for the actuary or any
other professional rendering services to the plan.
Actuaries would, in any case, be subject to a strict standard of
liability for the negligent performance of their functions, quite apart
from any provisions of ERISA.77 The significance and the danger of
being held to be a fiduciary relates more to the statutory prohibi-
tions and responsibilities associated with such status under ERISA
than to the standard of care required. Thus, an actuary as a fidu-
ciary may be responsible not only for his own performance, but also
for that of others under the co-fiduciary rules. If a person who deals
with a plan but who is not a fiduciary should discover that the plan
trustee (a fiduciary) has violated his trust, he has no responsibility
under ERISA with respect to such breach. If, however, his relation-
ship to the plan is that of a fiduciary, he will be required, under
ERISA, to take appropriate action to remedy the breach. Further-
more, a fiduciary becomes subject to the prohibited transaction
rules of ERISA which may result in liability whenever he benefits
individually from a transaction, or when he causes or permits the
occurrence of one of the specifically prohibited transactions of
ERISA.
prohibited transaction is imposed. "Correction," as used in the Act, refers to undoing the
transaction to the extent possible, but not placing the plan in a financial position worse than
that in which it would have been if fiduciary standards had been adhered to. Id., I.R.C. §
4975(f)(5).
The "amount involved" refers to the greater of the fair market value of the property given
or the fair market value of the property received in the transaction. If services are rendered,
this amount refers to the excess compensation. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(f)(4). With respect to the
five percent excise tax, the amount involved is valued as of the date of the transaction. Id.,
I.R.C. § 4975(f)(4)(A). With respect to the one hundred percent excise tax, the amount
involved is the highest value during the correction period. Id., I.R.C. § 4975(f)(4)(B). Such
excise tax can become alarmingly high in situations where the fair market value has increased
during the correction period, but decreased below the fair market value as of the date of the
transaction on the date of correction since the one hundred percent tax is imposed on the
highest value during the correction period.
76. Federal taxes are non-deductible expenses. See I.R.C. § 164.
77. See text accompanying notes 86-92 infra.
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Individual fiduciary status within the firm most probably at-
taches to the directors of the corporation, the committees and indi-
viduals who control the ERISA plan it maintains for its employees,
and others who accept appointments as trustees or administrators
of the plan. Fiduciary status may be conferred on an actuary merely
for his certification of values if such amounts to discretionary plan
management authority.7" In addition, the power to order payments
of particular amounts of pension benefits may be viewed as discre-
tionary administrative authority.7"
IV. ERISA's Impact
The greatest impact of ERISA is increased consumer awareness. 0
Participants and beneficiaries of a pension plan are now more often
inclined to commence litigation. ERISA creates a new dimension in
the actuary's relationship with his clients; e.g., the actuary may
have to become the liason for the participants in discussions with
employers.
Actuaries who do not desire to be classified as fiduciaries should
delineate issues and alternatives for their clients' consideration, but
should be circumspect about making final decisions."' Actuaries
should be certain that records of any meetings reflect that final
decisions were made by plan fiduciaries and not by the actuary. 2
In addition, it may be advantageous for the actuary to have a writ-
ten contract which details his responsibilities. Actuarial corpora-
tions should exercise caution with regard to prohibited transactions
and multiple services. To further limit professional liability, peer
review and the establishment of study sessions for actuarial employ-
ees to discuss personal liability have been recommended.13
78. Knickerbocker, Jr., Fiduciary Responsibility Under the Pension Reform Act, 10 REAL
PROP. PROB. AND Ta. J. 495, 505-06 (1975).
79. Id. at 505.
80. PENS. REP. (BNA), No. 127, Mar. 7, 1977 at A-12.
81. Id. at A-13.
82. Id.
83. Id. There will be uncertainties in the area of personal liability of the actuary, particu-
larly with the ill-defined fiduciary provisions of ERISA. So long as an actuary does not
commit a wrongful act or violate ERISA, he will. not be subject to a criminal sentence,
however, if some error is made, any liability may be incurred by his employer. Prospective
plaintiffs will contend that the enrolled actuary is a fiduciary under ERISA. Accordingly,
enrolled actuaries should take certain preventive measures. Actuaries should place priority
attention to matters of financial consequence; personal standards should be established and
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V. Errors and Omissions
Several types of errors or omissions that an actuary might commit
could lead to substantial liability. These include erroneous benefit
determinations for individuals, or for all participants in a valuation,
erroneous minimum funding calculations leading to an excise tax
penalty, overstatement of maximum deposit leading to a carryover
and a loss of the alternate use of money, and erroneous determina-
tion of liabilities for plan termination, plan amendments, mergers,
or acquisitions which result in decisions that might not otherwise
have been made." The actuary may incur liability by relying on
employer provided data,'by a failure to advise of the possibility of
substantial deviation of results, or from unwarranted delays which
result in penalties, lost opportunities or wrong decisions.85
A. Malpractice
The actuary, in making benefit determinations (either calculated
by the actuary, his firm, or the client under a system developed by
the actuary), can be sued for damages if these determinations are
wrong. For example, if an employee were overpaid his benefits, the
employer may never recover the excess, in which case the plan has
suffered a loss on account of the actuary. This amount would be
minimal in the case of one employee. However, if the actuary's
mistake is a recurring one (i.e., a systematic error), overpayments
can accumulate rapidly to the employer's detriment86
observed. In addition, actuaries should be certain that consequential items are reviewed
thoroughly. Furthermore, actuaries should be aware and familiar with all applicable laws,
particularly ERISA. Most importantly, actuaries must be careful not to act like a fiduciary
unless they are prepared to face the potential consequences. PENS. REP. (BNA), No. 173, Jan.
30, 1978 at A-21.
Within the actuarial firm, it has been suggested that quality controls (e.g., a set of rules
assigning and delegating responsibilies to certain individuals) include having a senior actuary
responsible for the computational procedures used in a final report. Also, principles and
procedures should be established in regard to data collection and the use of appropriate act
uarial methods and assumptions. Additionally, an actuary should state his reliance on an-
other professional's work where applicable (e.g., an accountant or attorney).
Although an enrolled actuary is subject to civil action under common law, as well as being
professionally liable under ERISA, the risks are not very high and can be controlled if the
actuary acts in a professional and responsible manner. Id. at A-22.
84. Personal Liability of the. Enrolled Actuary, ENROLLED ACTURARIEs' REPORT, Mar. 1977,
at 12.
85. Id.
86. Address by Donald S. Grubbs, Jr., The Joint Meeting of the American Academy of
Actuaries and the Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice (Feb. 28, 1977).
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Another problem in benefit determination could arise if the ac-
tuary informs a participant of the amount of benefit under various
options and these serve as the basis for an employee's selection of
an optional form of benefit.,7 For example, if an employee who se-
lected the life annuity dies shortly thereafter, and it is subsequently
determined that the joint and survivor benefit quoted was too low,
the surviving beneficiary may argue that the decedent would have
selected the joint and survivor annuity if he or she had received
correct information. 8
Minimal funding requirements of the plan sponsor are also deter-
mined by the actuary. If an employer is required to pay an excise
tax for a funding deficiency because the actuary misinformed him
of the proper minimum funding requirements, the employer may
attempt to recover from the actuary. 9
Actuaries often determine the maximum deductible contribution.
Errors in this area, however, can conceivably result in the disal-
lowed contribution being carried over and deductible in a subse-
quent year, so that there may be no actual damages to the employer.
There are situations, however, where the net effect is an increase in
taxes for which the employer may anticipate recovery from the ac-
tuary. 0
Employer's liability on plan termination may also be determined
by the actuary. Ordinarily, this situation would not cause any dam-
ages to the employer, since any excess in the contingent employer
liability which has been paid could normally be recovered. At times,
however, the loss of the use of money can damage a business far
beyond the interest gained on that money. Of greater import, if the
actuary has erred in the calculation of liability on plan termination
and his miscalculation is the basis for the employer's decision con-
cerning whether or not to terminate the plan, both employer and the
participants could sustain substantial damages.9
The actuary often determines cost and liabilities for amendments
to the plan which may include the increase in contingent employer








concerning a potential amendment may influence the employer's
decision regarding whether to adopt the amendment.2 If the actuary
erroneously has advised the employer that a particular amendment
will increase the plan costs by $X and the actual increase is $2X,
the employer may claim that the excess is a damage he suffered as
a result of accepting the actuary's determination.
B. The Equity Funding Scandal
The incidence of claims against professionals has risen sharply in
recent years.13 Professional liability insurance now is being written
for at least seventy different categories of professionals,94 including
actuaries. The massive fraud involved in the Equity Funding 5 deba-
cle serves to reinforce this statement.
The Equity Funding litigation arose out of an alleged securities
fraud perpetrated through Equity Funding Corporation of America
(EFCA) and its subsidiaries. The fraud at EFCA was commited over
an eight year period with the aid, complicity, and neglect of many
outside individuals or firms that knew or should have known about
the fraud. These "aider and abettor" defendants included certified
public accountants for EFCA and its subsidiaries, underwriters of
the EFCA debentures, national banks that extended credit to
EFCA, and a large national actuarial firm that did work for one of
EFCA's subsidiaries, Equity Funding Life Insurance Corporation
(EFLIC) .97
The actuarial firm rendered an opinion in support of EFLIC's
reported calculation of policy reserves, premiums, and accrued costs
of recapture of reinsured EFLIC policies. Common law negligence
92. Id.
93. Slain, Claims Against Professionals Continue to Show Sharp Rise, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30,
1977, at 4, col. 1.
94. Id.
- 95. Equity Funding Corporation of America, a financial services institution, began opera-
tions in 1960 with ten thousand dollars. By 1973, EFCA claimed to manage assets of one
billion dollars, a truly remarkable and unprecedented accomplishment. This growth was then
exposed as a complete fiction and the corporation soon filed for bankruptcy. EFCA came to
be known as "Wall Street Watergate." For a thorough narrative history of one of the greatest
frauds ever perpertrated, see R.L. DIRKS & L. GROSS, THE GREAT WALL STREET SCANDAL
(1974).
96. In re Equity Funding Corporation of America, 416 F. Supp. 161, 170-71 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
97. Id. at 171.
98. Id. at 195.
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claims against the "aiders and abettors" and common law fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty claims were asserted." The complaint al-
leged that the actuaries knew or should have known about the fraud
at EFLIC, through the exercise of due care'00 (one-third of all of
EFLIC's recorded life insurance policies were bogus entries). The
plaintiffs brought their claims under various sections of The Securi-
ties Act of 19331"' and The Securities Exchange Act of 1934.102 The
complaint clearly alleged that false and misleading statements were
issued by the actuarial firm in connection with the sale or purchase
of a security. 103
One of the actuaries employed by EFLIC was given a two year jail
sentence for his part in the fraud 04 and the consulting actuarial firm
settled out of court for $3 million.' 5 The exact issue raised in Equity
Funding (i.e. that the independent accountants or actuaries "should
have known" that the data was incorrect) could occur with regard
to a pension plan as easily as it did in a life insurance company.
VI. Conclusion
Actuaries and other professionals necessarily are concerned about
their potential exposure since the passage of ERISA and its fidu-
ciary provisions. It will be up to the courts to determine fiduciary
status on a case-by-case basis. There are a great number of possibili-
ties for an actuary to become a fiduciary under ERISA. °0 The ac-
tuary may become involved in design, implementation, and admin-
istration, especially in the case of a small pension plan where the
99. Id. at 172.
100. Id.
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77m (1970).
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970).
103. 416 F. Supp. at 195.
104. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1975, at 75, col. 7.
105. Barron's, Jan. 10, 1977, at 46, col. 2. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1976, at 29, col.
5 and N.Y.L.J., Nov. 26, 1976, at 2, col. 4 which report a total settlement by accountants,
actuaries, and underwriters to be between fifty and sixty million dollars.
106. An actuary has been named as a fiduciary under ERISA in numerous instances. See
Little, Jr. and Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L.
REv. at 5 (1977); Lamon, Jr., Professional Money Managers: Fiduciary Responsibility Under
ERISA, 11 REAL PROP. PROa. AND TR. J. at 556 (1976); Mueller, What Practitioners Should
Know About the Expanded Role of the Actuary Under ERISA, 42 J. TAXATION 149 (1975);
120 Cong. Rec. 3983 (1974); PENS. REP. (BNA), No. 160, Oct. 24, 1977 at A-29; Lab. Reg.
2509.75-5, D-1; Conkel, Fiduciary Duties - For Whom and When, 1 PENS. AND PROFIT-
SHARING TAX J. (1975).
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client is either unsophisticated or unwilling to do such for itself. If
it is proven that the actuary's conduct conforms to the above or his
advice is not in fact independent, but rather changed or modified
to comply with the client's desires, the actuary is no longer indepen-
dent as ERISA mandates that he must be. It will be a facts and
circumstances question and actuaries must be extremely careful to
avoid making decisions for their clients so that they do not attain
fiduciary status with its corresponding duties and responsibilities.
Plan participants are not unprotected if an actuary is not a fiduciary
under ERISA. The actuary must still exercise due care and will be
subject to liability for any fraud or negligence.
Robert H. Hershan

